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The American collective bargaining system became established and
took its present shape in the 1940s. The turmoil of change growing out of
the depression years and legislation which encouraged unionization and
collective bargaining-the Norris- La Guardia Act, Section 7 of the NLRA,
and the Wagner Act-was quieted by mobilization and wartime measures.
Unions took the "no-strike" pledge and strikes which impeded the war
effort were considered unpatriotic or denounced as "treasonous."
Collective bargaining disputes were resolved by the War Labor Board
("WLB"), which prescribed terms of settlement, including how collective
agreements should be administered. Union membership grew by fifty
percent during the war and some unions grew geometrically. The Auto
Workers and Steel Workers more than doubled, and the Electric Workers
quadrupled.
Professor Atleson, in this impressive and thoroughly researched study,
has traced the shaping of collective bargaining during the war with
particular focus on the role of the federal government acting through the
WLB. The study is a detached analysis of specific problems and the
WLB's response to those problems. In addition, it sets those problems in
the context of the political and social climate of the times. It not only
delineates the articulate policies of management and unions, but also
examines their underlying motivations and their institutional imperatives.
Professor Atleson describes how wartime regulation shaped our
collective bargaining system in four major respects. First, the WLB
regularly recommended or ordered parties coming before it to include in
their collective agreement provisions for a grievance procedure with
binding arbitration of disputes arising under the contract as the final step.
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The WLB would not order arbitration of interest disputes, that is, the terms
of the agreement, but only the interpretation and application of the
agreement. The primary purpose was to avoid strikes on day to day
problems. By the end of the war more than ninety percent of all collective
agreements had such provisions, and that remains the pattern today. The
Supreme Court has imbedded arbitration in labor law with the Steelworkers
Trilogy.!
Second, the WLB ordered inclusion of a no-strike clause prohibiting
strikes during the contract term. This was animated by the wartime "no
strike" policy, but was commonly considered as reinforcing arbitration. As
Professor Atleson points out, the clause was generally broader than the
arbitration clause so that the union could not strike, even though the dispute
did not involve interpretation or application of the agreement and was
therefore not arbitrable. This is still the pattern in collective agreements,
and the Supreme Court has extended the no-strike obligation beyond its
explicit terms. Applying its gratuitous aphorism that arbitration is the quid
pro quo for the no-strike clause, the Court held in Lucas Flour2 that where
there was an arbitration clause, a no-strike obligation would be implied.
Third, the WLB promulgated the policy that certain subjects were
"management prerogatives" about which the employer need not bargain. In
addition, the employer could change such terms without consulting the
union, and the union could not strike over these terms. The WLB thereby
excluded the union from having any voice in matters such as paid sick
leave, choice of personnel, and opening or closing of units. The employer
had unilateral control over these issues. Ultimately, the Board extended the
concept of management prerogatives by approving employer demands for
express management prerogative clauses in collective agreements; and
listing certain matters such as hiring, promotion, transfers, and scheduling
of work which were bargainable subjects as exclusively for management
during the contract term. The decisions of the WLB in this area shaped the
law under the National Labor Relations Act. In Borg-Warner,3 the
Supreme Court adopted the principle that there was no duty to bargain
about "non-mandatory" subjects. Although the category of "mandatory"
subjects has been expanded, the principle that certain subjects, such as
plant closure which directly affects employees' jobs, are still beyond the
employees' right to a voice persists. The Supreme Court, following the
precedent of the WLB, further limited the union's voice in American

1. UnitedSteelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of American v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers ofAmerica v. EnterpriseWheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
2. Local 17, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
3. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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National Insurance4 by holding that employers could insist on imposing a
management prerogative clause which gives the employer unilateral control
during the contract term over mandatory subjects. Strong employers can
thereby substantially shrink the area of joint decision making.
Fourth, one of the most pervasive and troublesome issues before the
WLB was the unions' demands for union security. The WLB was
unwilling to grant a closed or union shop, but the unions needed some
institutional security because they were strictly limited in their ability to get
wage increases or to strike for other benefits. The WLB hit on a
compromise, maintenance of membership. Although new employees were
not required to join, and present members could get out during a brief
window when the agreement terminated, in fact, most new employees
joined and few employees opted out. In practice, maintenance of
membership gave the unions the security of a union shop. Maintenance of
membership, however, did not survive; after the war unions returned to the
union shop. The Taft-Hartley Act provided the agency shop as a different
compromise. This system requires employees only to pay regular dues and
initiation fees, but not to become and remain members of the union. This
limited union security has been further circumscribed by the Supreme
Court, limiting compulsory dues to that portion used for collective
bargaining purposes.
Professor Atleson's thesis is that "legal regulation, policies and
pressures during the war had a profound effect on labor union structures,
labor law and collective bargaining in the post war period. ' 6 He
dramatically demonstrates that major institutions and practices took shape
under the wartime pressures and legal regulations. He makes a less
convincing case that our collective bargaining system, union structures, and
labor law would have been significantly different, but for the wartime
experience. A strong case can be made that the war only accelerated
developments which would have occurred anyway.
Grievance arbitration was not born of the WLB. It had existed since
the turn of the century in the coal industry and in the garment industry
since the 1920's; General Motors and the UAW established an arbitration
system in 1937. The WLB built on these models. Without wartime
pressures both union and management would likely have come to realize
that neither could afford a process of resolving day to day disputes over the
meaning of the agreement by the alternatives to arbitration of union
surrender or a strike. The WLB hastened the learning process, but there
4. NLRB v. American Nat'lIns. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
5. Communication Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988); Ellis v. Brotherhood of
Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); InternationalAss'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740 (1961).
6. Preface at ix.
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were existing models from which the parties would have learned, just as
parties after the war learned by the WLB example. Other countries have
recognized the need for peaceful dispute resolution procedures through
neutrals, most often labor courts; with a working model of arbitration, there
would be little enthusiasm by unions and management for the labor court
alternative.
Professor Atleson emphasizes that grievance procedures and
arbitration tend to centralize dispute resolution. Increasing reliance on
professional staff and bureaucratization resulted in the loss of contact and
common perspectives between officers and worker rank and file.
Established unions, however, were bureaucracies before the war, many of
which did not have centralized grievance procedures. Bureaucracy in
unions is more the product of aging and Michael's "Iron Law" than the
method of dispute settlement. Unions in Germany and Sweden are far more
centralized, more bureaucratic and less democratic, with no structured
grievance procedure or arbitration. Centralization of control in unions is
almost inevitable when dealing with employers with centralized control,
and this is particularly true in multi-plant enterprises.
The no-strike clause is almost a necessary complement to any
procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Arbitration cannot fully
serve its function of providing peace during the term of the agreement if the
union can choose either to strike or demand arbitration. For the union only
to be able to choose either to obey an award or strike makes a mockery of
the process. Once there was acceptance of arbitration as a method of
resolving disputes, it was inevitable that strikes for arbitrable disputes
would be banned. Conceivably, disputes over terms not settled by the
collective agreement could be left to economic conflict, but that would
require acceptance of the view that terms and conditions left open for the
duration of the agreement, as well as all unmentioned terms, remain open
for settlement by trial by battle. This issue was moot after the war, but the
wartime assumption prevailed that the contract settled all bargainable
terms, either regulating them or leaving them to management control.
"Management prerogatives" as a sacred area walled off from union
voice was articulated, promoted, and written into collective agreements by
the WLB. Unlike arbitration and no-strike clauses, this was not a necessary
element in a working collective bargaining system. On the contrary, it
undermines the purposes of the duty to bargain. The premise of the duty to
bargain is that the process of discussion and exchange of views will lead
the parties to better understand each other's felt needs and discover
possibilities to resolve or compromise conflicting interests. It thereby
furthers labor peace. To declare certain subjects in which the union has an
interest as non-discussable forecloses the values of bargaining and
increases the likelihood of economic conflict. If the union feels that it has
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an interest in a subject, that should be enough to require discussion. The
employer is always free to say "No" and provide reasons for its refusal.
Had the WLB not walled off "management prerogatives," our collective
bargaining system might have developed with a more open bargaining
process, as is the case in most other systems. We would have kept off the
bargaining table a bitter fruitless issue of whether a subject was
bargainable, and have been spared the never-ending litigation as to what
are "mandatory" subjects of bargaining. In this area, Professor Atleson
makes a convincing case that the WLB shaped our system, and not for the
best.
The "no-strike" pledge given by the unions after Pearl Harbor had
long term consequences that are difficult to trace. It cultivated a public
view that strikes were unnecessary, or even intolerable. Workers had an
opposite view, fed by wage restraints accompanied by inflated corporate
profits in the defense industries. This generated resentment and rebellious
response in the plants. One of Professor Atleson's best chapters describes
sources of the numerous wildcat strikes and the union leaders' efforts to
quiet them. Because the media and the politicians accented the number of
strikes and their costs in lost production, but neglected the reasons for the
strikes, the public supported legislation to prohibit the strikes. After the
war, the public image of unions was one of irresponsibility and strikes were
seen as a major union abuse. In the years after the war, in a effort to recoup
lost ground due to WLB restraints, the unions became involved in a wave
of strikes against corporations which had enjoyed excess profits. It was
this sequence of events which provided the political fuel for demands to
curb unions which were "too strong." The result was the Taft-Hartley Act.
The wartime experience thus may have had a long lasting and profound
effect.
However one might view the unprovable cause and effect
relationships, Professor Atleson has written an exceedingly illuminating
and detailed history of the crisis years when our collective bargaining
system was force-fed to maturity.

